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I. Introduction
The Tax Justice Network estimates $11.5 trillion in global
assets are hidden in offshore havens.1 Offshore tax evasion was
the primary issue in the recent case of United States v. UBS AG,2
a dispute between the United States and Switzerland’s largest
bank, United Bank of Switzerland (UBS).3 In 2007, former UBS
banker and American citizen, Bradley Birkenfeld, revealed that
UBS was actively involved in helping its U.S. clients evade
taxes.4 The Swiss bank entered into a deferred prosecution
agreement with the United States, in which UBS admitted to
fraud and conspiracy and agreed to pay $780 million in fines,

1. Editorial, If Switzerland Can . . . , N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2009, at A16.
2. United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV, 2009 WL 2241122 (S.D.
Fla. July 7, 2009).
3. See generally Jared Seff, Cracking Down on Tax Evaders—Swiss
Banking: Secrets, Lies, and Deception, 38 S.U. L. REV. 159 (2010) (detailing the
dispute between the United States, UBS, and Switzerland).
4. Banking: A Crack in the Swiss Vault, CBS NEWS (Aug. 15, 2010, 11:59
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/30/60minutes/main6038169.shtml
(last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Birkenfeld revealed that UBS managed assets for 19,000 U.S. clients totaling
approximately $19 billion. Id. He estimated that 90% of his own clients were
trying to evade taxes. Id. He neglected, however, to disclose his dealings with
his biggest client, California real estate developer Igor Olenicoff, whom
Birkenhoff helped hide $200 million. Id. Birkenfeld later pled guilty to
conspiracy to defraud the IRS and was sentenced to forty months in prison. Id.
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penalties, interest, and restitution.5 Subsequently, the United
States sued UBS in an attempt to force disclosure of nearly
52,000 secret accounts.6 As a result, the Swiss government struck
an unprecedented deal with the United States to provide client
names on 4,450 UBS accounts held by Americans despite its
previous argument that handing over such information violated
Swiss bank-secrecy laws.7 Although the case was arguably a
success for American tax enforcement officials, it brought to light
many of the current inadequacies of U.S. international tax
enforcement.8
In response to the UBS case and the call for heightened
international tax enforcement, Congress enacted the Foreign
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).9 By enhancing
5. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, UBS Enters Into Deferred
Prosecution Agreement (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/
February/09-tax-136.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Lynnley Browning, U.S. Drops
Criminal Charges Against UBS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at B3.
6. David Voreacos & Carlyn Kolker, U.S. Sues UBS Seeking Swiss
Account Customer Names, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2009, 2:25 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a_TaQP5WVZuA&
refer=home (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
7. If Switzerland Can, supra note 1.
8. See Hearing on Banking Secrecy Practices and Wealthy American
Taxpayers Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 4–5 (2009)
[hereinafter Hearing on Banking Secrecy] (“The ongoing events surrounding
UBS AG and its admitted criminal role in helping a number of wealthy U.S.
individuals evade U.S. taxes have brought a spotlight to bear on international
tax enforcement and the tools that we have at our disposal to help ensure
compliance.”); see also infra Part II.C (discussing existing international
enforcement mechanisms).
9. FATCA was introduced to both houses of Congress on October 27, 2009.
See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2009, S.1934, 111th Cong.; Foreign
Account Tax Compliance Act of 2009, H.R. 3933, 111th Cong. The House passed
a revised bill on December 9, 2009, changing the effective date to January 1,
2013 and adding a grandfather exception for existing obligations. See Carol
Tello, Reporting, Withholding, and More Reporting: HIRE Act Reporting and
Withholding Provisions, 39 TAX. MGM’T INT’L J. 243 (2010). The provisions were
signed into law on March 18, 2010 under Title V of the HIRE Act. Hiring
Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111–147, 124 Stat. 71
(2010). The HIRE Act provides tax benefits to employers who hire certain
previously unemployed workers. Id. §§ 101–02. The FATCA provisions were
included as offsetting provisions to raise revenue needed to fund the
exemptions. Id. § 501. The FATCA provisions comprise what is now Chapter 4 of
the IRC. Id. (to be codified at I.R.C. §§ 1471–74).
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information reporting, increasing withholding taxes for foreign
financial institutions that do not engage in information reporting,
and strengthening penalties for taxpayers who do not adequately
report their income, FATCA makes it more difficult for U.S.
persons to engage in offshore tax evasion.10 Despite FATCA’s
worthwhile goals of increasing tax enforcement and tracking
down tax evaders, its enactment raises several significant
concerns.11
This Note will argue that international cooperation is
essential for successful FATCA implementation. Part II will
provide background information on offshore tax evasion and
existing U.S. mechanisms for international tax enforcement. Part
III will explain key FATCA provisions, and Part IV will discuss
concerns regarding FATCA as originally enacted. Finally, Part V
will introduce the proposed intergovernmental approach to
FATCA and argue that international cooperation and
development of standardized requirements will mitigate FATCA
concerns and facilitate its implementation. Part V also argues
that abandonment of the U.S. policy of citizenship-based taxation
is necessary to achieve an efficient multilateral FATCA regime.
II. International Tax Enforcement
The U.S. federal income tax system is one of “voluntary
compliance,”12 meaning it is initially up to the taxpayer, rather
than the government, to determine and pay the appropriate
taxes.13 The United States currently has one of the world’s

10. Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
111th Cong. 7 (2009) [hereinafter FATCA Hearing] (statement of Stephen E.
Shay, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of the Treasury).
11. See infra Part IV (discussing primary areas of concern).
12. See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 176 (1960) (“Our system of
taxation is based upon voluntary assessment and payment, not upon
distraint.”).
13. See Rev. Rul. 2007-20, 2007-14 I.R.B. 863–64 (“References to a
‘voluntary’ tax system . . . mean a system that allows taxpayers to determine, in
the first instance, the correct amount of their tax and report their liability on
appropriate returns, rather than having the government make the
determinations for them.”).
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highest compliance rates for tax collections.14 Despite a relatively
high compliance rate, the United States suffers from a significant
tax gap.15 The tax gap is the difference between the amount of tax
imposed by law and the amount voluntarily and timely paid by
taxpayers for a given year.16 Nonfiling, underreporting, and
underpayment of taxes are all forms of noncompliance that
contribute to the tax gap.17
The two primary means of tax enforcement are withholding
and information reporting.18 Withholding taxes at the source
eliminates the possibility of nonpayment.19 Information reporting,
on the other hand, ensures the government has another source of
information to compare against the taxpayer’s filing.20 Thus, a
large portion of the tax gap results from income that is subject to
neither withholding nor information reporting.21
14. Hearing on Banking Secrecy, supra note 8, at 68 (statement of Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School). Internal
Revenue Service data for tax year 2006 report a voluntary compliance rate of
83.1% and a compliance rate of 85.5% after enforcement and late payments.
I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-4 (Jan. 6, 2012).
15. The most recent tax gap estimates from the IRS are based on data from
tax year 2006 and report a net tax gap of $385 billion for that year, including
revenue collected from late payments and IRS compliance and enforcement
efforts. IR-2012-4.
16. Nina E. Olson, Minding the Gap: A Ten-Step Program for Better Tax
Compliance, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7, 8 (2009); see also Hearing on Banking
Secrecy, supra note 8, at 68 (noting that the tax gap refers to “a difference
between the taxes [the IRS] collected and taxes it should have collected under
existing law”).
17. Internal Revenue Serv., Tax Gap Facts and Figures, 1 (2005),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tax_gap_facts-figures.pdf [hereinafter Tax Gap
Facts].
18. Hearing on Banking Secrecy, supra note 8, at 68; see also IR-2012-4
(“Compliance is highest where there is third-party information reporting and/or
withholding.”).
19. Melissa A. Dizdarevic, Comment, The FACTA Provisions of the HIRE
Act: Boldly Going Where No Withholding Scheme Has Gone Before, 79 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2967, 2972 (2011).
20. Id.; see also James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Reinstein, Tax
Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818, 821 (1998) (noting that “[i]nformation
reporting severely limits the scope for tax evasion on many significant income
and deduction items” and “reduces the potential for unintentional reporting
errors by clarifying for the taxpayer the amount that legally should be
reported”).
21. Hearing on Banking Secrecy, supra note 8, at 68.

1690

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1685 (2012)
A. Offshore Tax Evasion

Experts estimate that offshore tax evasion costs the U.S.
Treasury approximately $100 billion a year.22 Because domestic
tax laws vary from country to country, international taxation23
provides unique opportunities for noncompliance and complicates
enforcement efforts.24 This is particularly true of tax haven
countries. Although there is no single definition, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) identifies
four primary characteristics of tax haven countries: (1) absence of
or nominal amount of taxes imposed; (2) lack of transparency
about the application of tax laws and underlying documentation;
(3) laws or administrative practices that prevent the effective
exchange of information with other countries for tax purposes;
and (4) absence of a requirement that the taxpayer’s activity
within their jurisdiction be substantial.25 Access to these low-tax,
secretive jurisdictions provides an opportunity for U.S. persons to
effectively avoid taxation by moving assets and investments
offshore.26

22. Staff of S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs Subcomm. on
Investigations, 110th Cong., Rep. on Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax
Compliance 1 (Comm. Print 2008). But see Hearing on Banking Secrecy, supra
note 8, at 95 (recognizing that there are a range of estimates and it is difficult to
get a precise number).
23. For the purposes of this Note, the term “international taxation” refers
to the U.S. taxation of international transactions, persons, and investments.
Taxpayers subject to the international provisions of the U.S. tax rules and
reporting requirements can be grouped into four categories: (1) U.S. individuals
working, living, or holding assets abroad; (2) U.S. entities doing business
abroad; (3) Foreign individuals working or doing business in the United States;
and (4) Foreign entities doing business in the United States. TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE SERV., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 129 (2011).
24. Dizdarevic, supra note 19, at 2972.
25. Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., Tax Haven Criteria, http://www.
oecd.org/document/23/0,3343,en_2649_33745_30575447_1_1_1_1,00.html (last
visited Sept. 21, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See, e.g., Hearing on Banking Secrecy, supra note 8, at 67 (explaining
the extent to which U.S. residents can move assets offshore to tax haven
jurisdictions and avoid paying U.S. taxes).
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B. Chapter 3 Withholding: The Starting Point for International
Tax Enforcement
As a preliminary matter, the United States uses a
withholding system for U.S. source payments to foreign persons.27
A withholding agent must withhold 30% of any payment of fixed
or determinable annual or periodical (FDAP) income28 made to a
payee that is a foreign person, unless it has documentation
associating the payee with either a U.S. person or a foreign
“beneficial owner”29 entitled to a reduced withholding rate.30 A
withholding agent making a payment to a foreign person need not
withhold when the foreign person assumes withholding
responsibility as a qualified intermediary (QI),31 a U.S. branch of
a foreign person, a withholding foreign partnership, or an
authorized foreign agent.32 Therefore, by withholding at the
source, U.S. tax authorities ensure collection of the appropriate
amount of tax on certain U.S. source income of foreign persons.33
Because withholding does not apply to foreign assets of U.S.
persons, however, additional enforcement mechanisms are
needed to address offshore tax evasion.

27. See I.R.C. §§ 1441–42 (2006) (mandating withholding of tax on
payments to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations). The withholding
provisions are codified in Chapter 3 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code). Id.
at §§ 1441–63.
28. I.R.C. § 1441(b) (2006). Examples of FDAP include interest, dividends,
rent, salaries, and wages. Id. Exceptions are made for certain classes of income
including portfolio interest, bank deposit interest, and short-term original issue
discount. Treas. Reg. § 1441–2(a).
29. “The term beneficial owner means the person who is the owner of
income for tax purposes and who beneficially owns that income.” Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1441-1(c)(6).
30. Id. § 1.1441–1(b). A foreign person entitled to a treaty reduction of the
30% withholding rate must provide the withholding agent with a W–8BEN form
prior to the time of payment in order to receive the treaty benefits. Id. § 1.1441–
6(b)(1).
31. See infra Part II.C.3 (explaining the QI program).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441–1(b)(1).
33. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text (noting that withholding
at the source increases the voluntary compliance rate).
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C. The Importance of Information Reporting

A core problem in tax enforcement is information
asymmetry.34 A taxpayer has knowledge of, or at least ready
access to, the information necessary to determine his or her tax
liability.35 The government, on the other hand, must rely on the
information it obtains directly from the taxpayer or from third
parties.36 This is true in both the domestic and the international
context. For example, U.S. persons are legally obligated to
disclose foreign accounts in excess of $10,000 on an annual
Report of Foreign Banks and Financial Accounts (FBAR) form.37
Without third-party reporting, however, the government has no
way of knowing if a taxpayer failed to disclose or underreported
his or her foreign assets. Thus, “third-party information reporting
assists taxpayers in correctly computing and reporting their tax
liabilities, increases compliance with tax obligations, reduces the
incidence of and opportunities for tax evasion, and . . . helps to
maintain the fairness of the U.S. federal income tax system.”38
The United States uses a variety of tools to collect
information regarding U.S. persons with foreign assets. Current
information gathering methods include both cooperative and
unilateral measures.39
34. Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap:
When is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1733
(2010).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. I.R.S. Form TD F 90-22.1 (stating that FBAR reporting is required of
all U.S. persons with “a financial interest in or signature authority over foreign
financial accounts” exceeding $10,000 at any time during the calendar year).
Civil penalties for failure to file an FBAR start at $500 for a negligent violation.
31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(6)(A) (2006).
38. Regulations Relating to Information Reporting by Financial
Institutions and Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign Financial
Institutions and Other Foreign Entities, 77 Fed. Reg. 9,022, 9,022 (proposed
Feb. 15, 2012).
39. Cooperative methods of information gathering require international
assistance whereas unilateral methods of information gathering do not.
Samantha H. Scavron, Note, In Pursuit of Offshore Tax Evaders: The Increased
Importance of International Cooperation in Tax Treaty Negotiations After United
States v. UBS AG, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 157, 178 (2010).
Arguably, however, when unilateral methods are used to retrieve information
regarding offshore accounts, international assistance is often required for the
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1. Tax Treaties and Information Exchange Agreements
There are two principal forms of bilateral agreements used by
U.S. tax authorities for the exchange of information with other
countries: (1) articles in income tax treaties governing the exchange
of information and (2) Tax Information Exchange Agreements
(TIEAs).40 Article 26 of the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty41 requires
the contracting countries to exchange tax information as necessary
for carrying out provisions of the treaty or domestic laws of the
parties.42 Information received under Article 26 is treated as
confidential in the same manner as information obtained under the
domestic laws of that country.43 The agreement is limited to
information that is legally obtainable in the normal course of
administration of the requested country and does not include trade
secrets.44 Due to this limitation, banking secrecy rules may excuse
production of information.45
Similarly, TIEAs are bilateral agreements between countries
establishing policies and procedures regarding the exchange of
information. TIEAs are generally used when the parties do not have
a comprehensive bilateral income tax treaty containing an
information exchange provision.46 The agreements do not modify the
substantive rules of taxation in either country, but instead provide
for cooperation in eliciting information and other assistance for each
country in the enforcement of its tax laws.47 Since the United States
IRS to obtain all the evidence needed for a successful investigation and
prosecution. Id.
40. Hearing on Banking Secrecy, supra note 8, at 32 (statement of Peter H.
Blessing, Partner, Shearman & Sterling).
41. U.S. Treas. Dep’t Model Income Tax Treaty, Nov. 15, 2006 [hereinafter
U.S. Model Treaty]. The U.S. Model Treaty is the starting point of U.S.
negotiations for all tax treaties the United States enters into. PETER H.
BLESSING & CAROL DUNAHOO, INCOME TAX TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES ¶
1.02[4] (1999 ed.).
42. U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 41, art. 26. para. 1.
43. Id. para. 2.
44. Id. para. 3.
45. Hearing on Banking Secrecy, supra note 8, at 33 (statement of Peter H.
Blessing, Partner, Shearman & Sterling).
46. Id.
47. REUVEN AVI-YONAH ET AL., GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON INCOME TAXATION
LAW 217 (2011).
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and Barbados entered into the first TIEA in 1984, the United States
has extensively used TIEAs to obtain information needed for tax
enforcement.48 Banking secrecy laws may also inhibit the United
States’ ability to gather information pursuant to a TIEA.49
2. Qualified Intermediaries
In addition to income tax treaties and information exchange
agreements with other countries, the United States uses a QI
program to incentivize cooperation from foreign entities.50 The QI
program began in 2001 and is primarily directed at U.S.-source
income received by foreigners.51 Pursuant to a QI agreement,52 a
foreign institution provides the IRS with certain information
regarding its U.S. customers in exchange for simplified rules,
including non-customer-specific reporting and the ability to claim
more easily applicable exemptions or lower withholding taxes.53
Although the QI program is a valuable tool in international tax
enforcement, it has material shortcomings and, as evidenced by the

48. Id.
49. Supra note 45 and accompanying text.
50. The term “qualified intermediary” refers to an entity that is a party to a
withholding agreement with the IRS and may be a foreign financial institution,
a foreign clearing house, a foreign branch of a U.S. financial institution or
clearing organization, a foreign corporation for purposes of presenting claims of
benefits under an income tax treaty on behalf of its shareholders, or any other
person acceptable to the United States. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1(e)(5)(ii). The IRS
currently has over 5,000 QI Agreements in force. Hearing on Banking Secrecy,
supra note 8, at 40 (statement of Peter H. Blessing, Partner, Shearman &
Sterling).
51. Itai Grinberg, Beyond FATCA: An Evolutionary Moment for the
International Tax System 13 (Georgetown Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper
No. 160, 2012), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fwps_
papers/160.
52. See Rev. Proc. 2000-12, 2000-01 C.B. 387.
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.441-1(e)(5); see also FATCA Hearing, supra note 10, at
7.
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UBS case,54 considerable potential for abuse with respect to U.S.
accountholders.55
3. Voluntary Disclosure
On several occasions, the IRS has offered amnesty for
voluntary disclosure by allowing U.S. taxpayers to disclose
foreign assets without the threat of criminal punishment.56
Although taxpayers escape criminal liability under the offshore
voluntary disclosure initiatives (OVDI), financial penalties still
apply.57 The 2009 and 2011 OVDIs resulted in a combined 33,000
voluntary disclosures and the collection of more than $4.4
billion.58 The repeated use of voluntary disclosure initiatives,
however, may result in diminishing returns and reduce
incentives to comply due to a belief that an opportunity will exist
to come forward under future amnesties.59

54. See FATCA Hearing, supra note 10, at 2 (“The recent UBS case
revealed problems with the QI program that permitted tax evasion by U.S.
persons.”); see also Hearing on Banking Secrecy, supra note 8, at 40–41
(statement of Peter H. Blessing, Partner, Shearman & Sterling) (assessing the
QI program and its current shortcomings).
55. FATCA Hearing, supra note 10, at 9–10 (“While [the QI] regime has
been effective in improving compliance with U.S. tax laws in relation to
collecting withholding taxes on foreign persons, its provisions relating to U.S.
accountholders have been subject to abuse by some foreign banks.”).
56. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2011-94 (Sept. 15, 2011) (“The programs
gave U.S. taxpayers with undisclosed assets or income offshore a second chance
to get compliant with the U.S. tax system, pay their fair share and avoid
criminal charges.”); see also I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5 (Jan. 9, 2012)
(announcing the reopening of the IRS voluntary disclosure program).
57. See IR-2012-5 (reporting that the 2012 program imposes a penalty of
27% of the highest aggregate balance in foreign accounts or value of foreign
assets during the eight tax years prior to the disclosure).
58. Id.
59. See Leandra Lederman, The Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in
the Battle of Offshore Tax Evasion, 55 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (arguing
that repeated use of voluntary disclosure initiatives may have diminishing
returns unless the government continues to make well-publicized criminal
prosecutions).
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4. Tax Whistleblowers

Another tool used for information gathering is whistleblower
incentives. Under U.S. tax laws, a whistleblower may be entitled
to up to 30% of the amount collected by the government from a
noncompliant taxpayer.60 Despite the high potential monetary
rewards, whistleblowers may be reluctant to come forward due to
the infrequency of whistleblower rewards awarded61 and the
possibility of criminal punishment.62
5. John Doe Summons
When the IRS suspects a federal tax violation has occurred
by unknown persons, it may issue a “John Doe” summons for the
relevant financial information.63 The IRS may summon
information when it can establish that (1) the summons relates to
a particular person or ascertainable class; (2) a reasonable basis
exists for issuing the summons; and (3) no adequate alternative
for acquiring the information exists.64 To enforce a summons in
U.S. courts, the IRS must prove that the investigation serves a
legitimate purpose, the information might be relevant to that
60. I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2006). Whistleblowers may be entitled to 15–30% of
the amount collected, including penalties and interest, as a result of
administrative or judicial action or settlement. Id. The amount of the award
depends upon the extent to which the individual substantially contributed to the
action or settlement. Id.
61. The first whistleblower award was received in 2011 by an in-house
accountant and netted the IRS $20 million in taxes and interest. Associated
Press, IRS Awards $4.5M to Whistleblower, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (Apr. 8, 2011),
http://www.suntimes.com/news/nation/4736164-418/irs-awards-whistleblower4.5m (last visited Sept. 23, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
62. UBS whistleblower Bradley Birkenfeld was sentenced to 40 months in
prison and received a $30,000 fine despite offering the U.S. Government
information crucial to its UBS investigation. Erik Larson & Carlyn Kolker, UBS
Tax Fraud Case Whistleblower Gets 40-Month Prison Sentence, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 21, 2009, 3:11 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=aqRUmD2LzH.E (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also supra note 4 (detailing Birkenfeld’s
involvement in the UBS investigation).
63. I.R.C. § 7609(f) (2006).
64. Id.
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purpose, the IRS did not already possess the information, and the
initial requirements of Section 7609(f) were met.65 Because a
John Doe summons is a unilateral mandate, enforcement issues
arise when a foreign entity holds the information.66
6. Title 31 Subpeonas
Most recently, the IRS has used Title 31 subpoenas67 to
compel U.S. taxpayers suspected of holding offshore accounts to
turn over bank account details.68 Under Title 31 of the U.S. Code,
the U.S. government may compel production of records and
documents for purposes of an investigation.69 When subpoenaed,
the taxpayer faces a choice of disclosing potentially selfincriminating evidence or being found in contempt of court and
subject to civil or criminal penalties, including jail time.70
Approximately a dozen Title 31 subpoenas were issued in 2011,
and it remains to be seen whether the IRS will increase its use of
this new enforcement technique.71

65. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
66. See Emily Busch, Note, To Enforce or Not to Enforce? The UBS John
Doe Summons and a Framework for Policing U.S. Tax Fraud Amid Conflicting
International Law and Banking Secrecy, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 185, 198–201 (2010)
(explaining that courts may quash a John Doe Summons based on comity and
conflicting foreign laws).
67. 31 U.S.C. § 3804 (2006).
68. Lynnley Browning, New US Tactic for Suspected Swiss Bank Tax
Cheats, REUTERS (Dec. 29, 2011, 12:15 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011
/12/29/uk-usa-swiss-client-subpoenas-idUSLNE7BS00620111229 (last visited
Sept. 21, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). American
taxpayers receiving the subpoenas include those who applied too late to one of
two voluntary disclosure programs and clients identified by several recently
indicted or charged Swiss bankers. Id.
69. 31 U.S.C. § 3804(a) (2006). Title 31 subpoenas are more commonly used
against drug smugglers and money launderers. Browning, supra note 68.
70. Id. § 3804(c). If an individual refuses to obey a subpoena, the U.S.
District Courts have jurisdiction to enforce the subpoena. Id. Failure to obey a
court order is punishable by the court as contempt. Id.
71. Id. Recently, a wealthy California taxpayer unsuccessfully challenged a
Title 31 subpoena on Fifth Amendment grounds. M.H. v United States, 648 F.3d
1067 (9th Cir. 2011).
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III. FATCA

Congress enacted FATCA in response to the gaps in existing
tax enforcement mechanisms.72 Although the ability to use
offshore tax havens to evade income taxes has increased in recent
decades, the U.S. government’s tools to combat evasion have not
changed significantly.73 FATCA provides the IRS with the
“enhanced tools it needs to continue its expansion of international
tax enforcement.”74
A. FATCA’s Goals and Mission
FATCA’s primary goal is to raise revenue by tracking down
tax evaders.75 More specifically, it is designed to address the
“deliberate and illegal hiding of assets and income from the IRS
by U.S. citizens and residents.”76 Because an estimated $100
billion is lost annually as a result of offshore tax abuses,77 a
significant amount of revenue is at stake.
B. FATCA’s Design
FATCA is designed to increase the government’s access to
information regarding U.S. citizens and residents with foreign
assets, in hopes of detecting and deterring offshore tax evasion. It
72. See supra Part II.C (discussing existing enforcement mechanisms).
73. See Hearing on Banking Secrecy, supra note 8, at 68 (statement of
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich. Law School) (noting that
“since about 1980 there has been a dramatic lowering of both legal and
technological barriers to the movement of capital, goods and services”);
Grinberg, supra note 51, at 2 (“The ability to make, hold, and manage
investments through offshore financial institutions has increased dramatically
in recent years, while the cost of such services has plummeted.” (citations
omitted)).
74. FATCA Hearing, supra note 10, at 17 (statement of William J. Wilkins,
Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv.).
75. Micah Bloomfield & Dmitriy Shamrakov, The Thirty Percent Solution?:
FATCA Provisions of the HIRE Act, STROOCK SPECIAL BULLETIN, Apr. 21, 2010,
at 1.
76. FATCA Hearing, supra note 10, at 13.
77. 156 CONG. REC. S1745 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2010); see also supra note 22
and accompanying text.
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adopts a two-prong approach to enhancing the Government’s
access to information, one focusing directly on taxpayers and the
other on foreign financial institutions (FFIs).78
1. Self-Reporting
FATCA requires individual U.S. taxpayers with foreign
accounts and assets exceeding $50,000 on the last day of the tax
year, or $150,000 at any time during the tax year, to report them
on an information return.79 Most American citizens living abroad
will likely have over $50,000 in foreign financial assets and, as a
result, meet the threshold for Section 6038 reporting.80 Failure to
disclose results in an initial $10,000 penalty.81 Additionally, the
new provisions extend the statute of limitations for failure to
disclose from three years to six.82 These reporting requirements
operate in addition to FBAR filing requirements83 and may be
enforced using traditional IRS enforcement mechanisms.84

78. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111–147,
§ 501, 511, 124 Stat. 71 (2010). FATCA also addresses several other areas of
foreign asset reporting that are beyond the scope of this Note. See id. at § 521–
41 (addressing passive foreign investment companies, foreign trusts, and
dividend equivalent payments received by foreign persons).
79. I.R.C. § 6038D(a) (2006). The reporting threshold doubles for a married
couple filing jointly. I.R.S. Instructions for Form 8938, 1 (Dec. 15, 2011). A
higher reporting threshold of $200,000, or $400,000 if married and filing a joint
return, applies to taxpayers living abroad. Id.
80. Alan S. Lederman & Bobbe Hirsh, The American Assault on Tax
Havens—Status Report, 44 INT’L LAW. 1141, 1147 (2010).
81. I.R.C. § 6038D(d) (2006). The IRS may impose additional penalties of
up to $50,000 for continued failure to file after IRS notification and 40% of any
understatement of tax attributable to non-disclosed assets. I.R.S. News Release
IR-2011-117 (Dec. 14, 2011).
82. Id. § 513(a), 124 Stat. at 111 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6501).
83. See IR-2011-117 (“The new Form 8938 requirement does not replace or
otherwise affect a taxpayer’s obligation to file an FBAR.”).
84. See FATCA Hearing, supra note 10, at 15 (noting that FATCA creates
reporting obligations and a penalty regime separate from FBAR and allows the
IRS to enforce the new penalties using traditional IRS enforcement tools).
Conversely, the IRS cannot enforce FBAR penalties because they are imposed
through the Bank Secrecy Act and not the Code. Id. at 14. An FBAR penalty
must instead be referred to the Justice Department for separate prosecution and
collection. Id. at 15.
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2. Third-Party Reporting

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of FATCA is its
application to FFIs.85 FATCA gives FFIs a choice between
disclosure of U.S. account holders and a 30% withholding tax on
U.S. source income.86 In doing so, FATCA creates a powerful
incentive for FFIs to disclose information regarding U.S.
accounts.87
To meet the information reporting requirements, an FFI
must agree to collect information necessary to identify its U.S.
accounts.88 For each U.S. account, the FFI must report the name,
address, and Tax Identification Number (TIN) of each account
holder; the account number; the account balance; and the gross
receipts and withdrawals from the account.89 Alternatively, an
FFI may elect to be subject to the same reporting requirements as
U.S. financial institutions.90 These requirements operate in
addition to any existing reporting obligations under a QI
Agreement.91
If an FFI chooses not to comply with FATCA’s reporting
requirements, a 30% withholding tax is imposed on all
“withholdable payments.”92 There are several notable distinctions
85. “FFIs are defined in such a manner as to include foreign banks, foreign
brokerage firms, foreign trust companies, foreign mutual funds, foreign hedge
funds, foreign private equity funds, and other foreign funds engaged primarily
in investing or trading in U.S. or foreign securities.” Lederman & Hirsh, supra
note 80, at 1143 (citing I.R.C. § 1471(d)(4), (5)). A subsequent IRS notice
clarified this definition and excepted from FFI characterization certain foreign
companies. See I.R.S. Notice 2010–60.
86. I.R.C. § 1471(a).
87. See 156 CONG. REC. S1746 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2010) (“The legislative
intent behind [this choice] is to force foreign financial institutions to disclose
their U.S. account holders.”); see also FATCA Hearing, supra note 10, at 10
(statement of Stephen E. Shay, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of the Treasury)
(“[FATCA] will improve information reporting with respect to U.S.
accountholders by creating a powerful incentive for [FFIs] to provide the IRS
with the information it needs to identify persons seeking to evade U.S. tax.”).
88. I.R.C. § 1471(b) (2006).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. § 1471(c)(3).
92. Id. § 1471(a). The term “withholdable payment” includes “any payment
of interest . . . dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities,
compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and any other fixed or
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between FATCA withholding and existing withholding
requirements under Chapter 3 of the Code.93 First, FATCA
imposes withholding on gross proceeds from the sale or
disposition of income-producing property from a U.S. source and
fixed or determinable annual or periodical (FDAP) income.94
Second, Chapter 3 withholding only applies to payments to
nonresident aliens and foreign corporations,95 whereas FATCA
withholding applies to all U.S. source payments.96 Finally, failure
to meet FATCA information disclosure requirements may result
in a QI being withheld upon.97 As a result, FATCA creates a more
expansive withholding scheme than previously existed.98
IV. FATCA Issues and Concerns
Although many agree that increased enforcement of offshore
tax evasion is desirable, critics have raised numerous issues
associated with FATCA’s approach.99

determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income” from sources
within the U.S. or “any gross proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any
property of a type which can produce interest or dividends from sources within
the [U.S.].” Id. § 1473(1)(A).
93. See supra Part II.B (describing Chapter 3 withholding).
94. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing “withholdable
payments”); see also I.R.C. §§ 1441(b), 1473(1) (2006).
95. Id §§ 1441–42.
96. Id. § 1473(1).
97. Supra note 91 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (contrasting FATCA
withholding from existing withholding requirements in the Code).
99. See FATCA Hearing, supra note 10, at 69 (statement of American
Citizens Abroad) (raising concerns regarding citizens abroad, international
trade and finance, and reciprocal treatment from foreign governments); id. at 72
(statement of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America)
(concerning potential limits on the flow of foreign capital into the U.S. and
disruptions in the international capital markets); id. at 80 (statement of
American Bankers Association) (“The scope and application of [FATCA] is overly
broad and will lead to certain unintended consequences.”).
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A. Citizens Living Abroad

FATCA’s enactment caused significant outcry from U.S.
citizens living abroad.100 Due to the financial and administrative
burdens of holding U.S. accounts under a FATCA regime,101 some
FFIs are severing ties with U.S. accountholders.102 As a result,
U.S. citizens may be unable to establish and maintain bank
accounts in foreign countries.103 Depending on eventual FATCA
exclusions, U.S. citizens may also face difficulty in purchasing
certain foreign insurance policies and pension funds.104
Additionally,
the
burdensome
individual
reporting
requirements and harsher penalties are causing Americans to reevaluate, and in some cases terminate, their U.S. citizenry.105
100. See Am. Citizens Abroad, FATCA Destroys Lives and the US Economy,
AMERICAN CITIZENS ABROAD (Dec. 20, 2011), http://americansabroad.org/issues/fatca/
fatca-destroys-lives-and-the-us-economy/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (claiming that
“FATCA legislation will destroy the lives of average, honest and hard working
Americans”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also FATCA
Hearing, supra note 10, at 69–71 (statement of American Citizens Abroad)
(expressing the organization’s concerns with FATCA).
101. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the financial and administrative burden
on FFIs).
102. See FATCA Hearing, supra note 10, at 70 (noting that UK, Swiss, Dutch,
and Spanish banks are refusing American citizens residing in their countries as
clients and closing accounts); Daniel J. Mitchell, Why Obama’s FATCA Law is a
Threat to Business Growth, FORBES (June 20, 2011, 11:50 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2011/06/20/why-obamas-fatca-law-is-a-threatto-business-growth/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (citing a dozen accounts of U.S.
citizens getting the cold shoulder from foreign banks) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
103. See FATCA Hearing, supra note 10, at 70 (“The [FATCA] legislation
and reinforced QI regulations will make it all the more difficult for overseas
Americans to maintain a bank account where they reside.”).
104. See Lederman & Hirsh, supra note 80, at 1147 (discussing obstacles
that citizens living abroad may face under FATCA).
105. See Barrie McKenna, Americans in Canada Driven to Divorce From
Their Country, GLOBE AND MAIL (Nov. 8, 2011, 7:32 PM), http://www.
theglobeandmail.com/news/world/americans-in-canada-driven-to-divorce-fromtheir-country/article2229969/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (noting that 1,534
Americans renounced their U.S. citizenship in 2010, more than twice as many
as in 2009 and a sevenfold increase from 2008) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); see also Brian Knowlton, More American Expatriates Give Up
Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
04/26/us/26expat.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (discussing the increase in
renunciation in U.S. citizenship and citing frustration with recent tax and
banking regulation as the primary cause) (on file with the Washington and Lee
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Renunciation of citizenship, however, comes at a price.106
Individuals are not relieved of their existing tax liabilities and
are required to file back taxes and pay any penalties owed.
Furthermore, an exit tax is imposed on individuals with an
annual income of approximately $150,000 or a net worth of at
least $2 million.107 Thus, renunciation only serves as a way for
individuals to avoid U.S. reporting requirements and related
penalties after the date of renunciation.
B. Conflict of Laws: Tax Treaties and Banking Secrecy
A second issue raised by FATCA is that it overrides any
conflicting provisions contained in current income tax treaties.108
The United States’ policy concerning treaty override provides
that “the treaty is superior if it is implemented after a law, but
the law is superior if it is implemented after the treaty.”109
FATCA requires greater information reporting than current tax
treaties.110 If an FFI does not comply, FATCA imposes a 30%
withholding tax regardless of reduced withholding rates under a
governing treaty.111 To obtain preferential rates under a treaty,
taxpayers must rely on a refund mechanism.112 Despite the

Law Review).
106. The Department of State currently imposes a $450 fee for renunciation.
Id.
107. I.R.C. § 877(a)(2) (2006). All property of an individual subject to these
provisions is treated as sold on the day before expatriation for its fair market
value and any gain or loss on such sale is recognized for the taxable year. Id.
§ 877A(a).
108. See FATCA Hearing, supra note 10, at 62 (“Treaty overrides adversely
affect the treaty-making process and historically have been avoided unless
essential to the ends sought by the legislation.”).
109. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction, in THE
EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 105 (Karl P. Sauvant &
Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009). This is generally referred to as the “later in time” rule.
See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (stating that if a treaty and
congressional law conflict, the treaty dated more recently controls).
110. Compare supra note 89 and accompanying text (detailing FATCA
reporting requirements), with supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text
(explaining the U.S. Model Treaty provisions regarding information exchange).
111. I.R.C. § 1471(a) (2006).
112. This practice is largely consistent with existing refund mechanisms
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possibility of a refund, the taxpayer is not necessarily held
harmless, as no interest will be paid on the refund amount where
an FFI is the beneficial owner of the payment.113
Bank secrecy laws raise another issue of FATCA
enforcement.114 Because many countries forbid banks or
companies to transfer client information directly to a foreign
government, FFIs in those countries that serve U.S. citizens will
have no choice but to be withheld upon.115 Some view FATCA’s
conflict with bilateral agreements and foreign laws as U.S.
legislative overreach and an imposition on national
sovereignty.116
C. Costs and Administrative Burden on FFIs
Another concern with FATCA’s requirements is the resulting
burden on FFIs. First, banks face potentially high compliance
costs related to new technology and staffing.117 The Institute of
International Bankers estimates that major global banks may
under Section 1445(c)(1)(c). See id. § 1474(b)(1) (stating that, subject to certain
exceptions, determination of whether a withholding resulted in overpayment
shall be made as if the tax had been deducted and withheld under Chapter 3 of
the Code). It is unclear whether FATCA withholding may be reduced to the level
specified in a particular treaty if the withholding agent receives a beneficial
owner withholding certificate (W-8BEN), as allowed under preexisting law.
Treas. Reg. 1.1441–(6)(b).
113. I.R.C. § 1474(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2006).
114. See David Jolly & Brian Knowlton, Law to Find Tax Evaders
Denounced, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2011, at 1 (“Enforcement of the law will be
tricky, as many countries . . . forbid banks or companies to transfer such
information directly to a foreign government.”) (quoting Jeffrey Owens, tax
expert at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).
115. Id.
116. See Scott D. Michel & H. David Rosenbloom, FATCA and Foreign Bank
Accounts: Has the U.S. Overreached?, TAX ANALYSTS 709, 711 (2011), available
at http://www.capdale.com/files/4178_FATCA%20Article.pdf (“In an era of
delicately negotiated tax treaties and information exchange agreements
between the United States and other nations, FATCA is seen as overreaching.”).
117. John Greenwood, TD Resists U.S. Plan to Catch Tax Cheats, FINANCIAL
POST (Apr. 26, 2011, 12:24 PM), http://business.financialpost.com/2011/04/26/tdopposes-u-s-plan-to-catch-tax-cheats/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (noting that
Toronto-Dominion Bank is resisting the regulation because it would cause the
bank to incur $100 million in compliance costs) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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spend over $250 million to comply with the regulation,118 while
some businesses fear the annual costs will be in the billions.119
Additionally, the reporting requirements create an administrative
burden and raise efficiency concerns.120 Ultimately, FATCA forces
foreign institutions to bear the costs of tracking down U.S. tax
evaders.121
D. Detriment to U.S. Investments
Due to FATCA’s strategic design, the only way a foreign entity
can avoid the reach of these provisions is by not investing in the
United States.122 Simply refusing to accept U.S. persons as account
holders will not relieve a foreign entity from being subject to the
FATCA provisions because it is the payment of U.S. source income
that triggers its application.123 Thus, the desire to avoid costs
associated with compliance may discourage U.S. investments.124
Alternatively, FFIs that choose to comply might shift compliance
costs to U.S. investors.125
118. Id. But see A Temperature Check: Who’s Ready for FATCA?, RBC Dexia
Investor Services 8 (2011) (reporting that 85% of respondents estimate costs at
$1 million or less, with the majority (54%) expecting to spend less than
$100,000).
119. See Jolly & Knowlton, supra note 114 (“FATCA . . . is now causing
alarm among businesses outside the United States that fear they will have to
spend billions of dollars a year to meet the greatly increased reporting
burdens.”).
120. See Hearing on Banking Secrecy, supra note 8, at 31 (statement of Peter
H. Blessing, Partner, Shearman & Sterling) (noting that “there is a real
economic efficiency cost to reporting requirements”).
121. See Jolly & Knowlton, supra, note 114 (“[Foreign] entities are being
asked, in effect, to pay for the cost of tracking down American tax evaders.”).
122. Tello, supra note 9, at 3.
123. Id.
124. See Comment: FATCA Could Well Cause Managers to Turn Their Back
on the US, HEDGEWEEK (May 9, 2011), http://www.hedgeweek.com/2011/
09/05/130115/comment-fatca-could-well-cause-managers-turn-their-backs-us
(last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (predicting foreign managers and investors will
choose not to maintain U.S. assets) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also FATCA Hearing, supra note 10, at 30 (citing concerns that the
real cost of U.S. investment will increase significantly for non-U.S. investors);
id. at 70 (noting that, as a result of FATCA, several FFIs are refusing to invest
in American securities).
125. Bloomfield & Shamrakov, supra note 75, at 6.
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E. Lack of Adequate Taxpayer Services

Finally, FATCA introduces additional complexity into an
already highly complex system of international taxation.126
Although the IRS claimed improvements to taxpayer service as
its top strategic goal in 2008, there has been a shift in focus from
taxpayer service to international law enforcement.127 In her 2011
annual report to Congress, National Taxpayer Advocate Nina
Olson expressed concern that “[t]he lack of efficient IRS-wide
coordination of international taxpayer service may undermine the
international enforcement initiatives and discourage future
compliance by taxpayers dealing with the complexity and
procedural burden of the international tax rules.”128
V. International Collaboration Is Essential to FATCA
Implementation
A. International Issues Require an International Solution
Because FATCA specifically targets foreign sources of
information, international collaboration and compromise is
essential to its successful implementation.129 The development of
a multilateral agreement could mitigate the potential unintended
consequences of FATCA in several key ways.130 First,
international agreement would reduce the practical effect of
treaty override and conflict with foreign law.131 Further, the
existence of a multilateral information exchange regime may
126. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 23, at 32–33 (explaining that
the “complexity and administrative detail of the international reporting
requirements are overwhelming”).
127. See id. at 177 (detailing the IRS’s organizational shift away from
taxpayer service and toward enforcement).
128. Id. at 176.
129. See FATCA Hearing, supra note 10, at 10 (noting that international
cooperation and coordination is key to FATCA’s success) (statement of William
J. Wilkins); id. at 59 (“A multi-lateral agreement on the sharing of taxpayer
financial information would better serve the enforcement objectives of FATCA
without [the] unintended consequences.”) (statement of Dirk Suringa, Covington
& Burlington LLP).
130. Id. at 62.
131. Id.
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justify placing higher regulatory burdens on FFIs, as it would
benefit more than one country. Similarly, developing
international standards for cross-border information reporting
would improve efficiency and lower compliance burdens on
FFIs.132 International agreement would also prevent governments
from adopting a reciprocal withholding tax or conflicting
reporting measures.133 Finally, the more jurisdictions that
participate in a multilateral automatic information exchange
agreement, the less of an incentive FFIs and foreign investors
would have to divest from the United States.134
B. Other Countries Are Willing to Collaborate
Because tax evasion is a global problem,135 information
exchange is of great interest to foreign tax authorities.136 “Since
April 2009, a growing number of governments and NGOs have
called for the automatic exchange of tax information.”137 In recent
years both the EU and the OECD developed proposals for
multilateral automatic information reporting.138 This trend
evidences an acknowledgement that collaboration is essential in
the fight against offshore tax evasion139 and a willingness to
participate in a multilateral automatic information reporting
regime.
132. Lack of international standards presents the possibility that FFIs will
be subject to a variety of conflicting regulations from different countries.
133. See FATCA Hearing, supra note 10, at 61.
134. Id.
135. Doug Saunders, We Need a Global Army of Tax Collectors, GLOBE AND
MAIL (Oct. 15, 2011, 2:00 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/
opinion/we-need-a-global-army-of-tax-collectors/article2201647/ (last visited
Sept. 21, 2012) (“The non-payment of tax has become a chronic problem around
the world.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Jolly &
Knowlton, supra note 114.
136. Hearing on Banking Secrecy, supra note 8, at 38 (statement of Peter H.
Blessing, Partner, Shearman & Sterling) (“The information exchange process is
of great interest to U.S. tax authorities, but for similar reasons it is of great
interest to many foreign tax authorities.”).
137. Grinberg, supra note 51, at 3 (citations omitted).
138. See id. at 17–23 (describing the current OECD and EU approaches to
cross-border information reporting).
139. Hearing on Banking Secrecy, supra note 8, at 9 (statement of Doug
Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv.).
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C. Toward an Intergovernmental Approach

The United States took the first step toward international
cooperation in February 2012.140 In addition to releasing the
proposed FATCA regulations,141 the Treasury Department issued
a Joint Statement142 with France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the
United Kingdom announcing the desire to cooperate in an
intergovernmental approach to improving international tax
compliance and implementing FATCA.143 Notably, the United
States expressed its intent to reciprocate in collecting and
exchanging information on accounts held in U.S. financial
institutions by residents of FATCA partner countries.144 The
intergovernmental approach would address “legal impediments to
compliance, simplify practical implementation, and reduce FFI
costs.”145 International collaboration, therefore, “would enhance
compliance and facilitate enforcement to the benefit of all
parties.”146
The joint statement proposes a bifurcated routing
approach,147 one for FATCA partners and another for non-partner
nations. FFIs established in a FATCA partner nation would
report information to that country.148 This system ensures that
140. Regulations Relating to Information Reporting by Financial
Institutions and Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign Financial
Institutions and Other Foreign Entities, 77 Fed. Reg. 9,022, 9,023 (proposed
Feb. 15, 2012) (“[C]onsistent with the policies underlying [FATCA], the
Treasury Department and the IRS remain committed to working cooperatively
with foreign jurisdictions on multilateral efforts to improve transparency and
information exchange on a global basis.”).
141. Id.
142. U.S. Treas. Dep’t Press Release, Joint Statement from the United
States, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom Regarding an
Intergovernmental Approach to Improving International Tax Compliance and
Implementing FATCA (Feb. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Joint Statement].
143. Id.
144. Id. at A.5.
145. Id. at A.3.
146. Id.
147. Routing addresses how FFIs must route information to residence
country governments. Grinberg, supra note 51, at 17.
148. Joint Statement, supra note 142, at B.2.b. This routing system is
similar the EU Savings Directive approach. Grinberg, supra note 51, at 18–21
(describing the EU approach for automatic information reporting).
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FFIs in cooperative jurisdictions need only send information to
one government, under whose laws they already operate,
avoiding the possibility of FFIs attempting to comply with
different reporting obligations to dozens of governments.149
“Reporting by financial institutions to the government of the
jurisdiction in which they reside, followed by government-togovernment exchange . . . conforms most closely to current global
understandings regarding first-instance sovereign access to
banking information.”150 This system avoids the conflict of laws
issues associated with financial institutions reporting directly to
foreign sovereigns.151
Compliant FFIs in non-partner countries, however, are
required to report directly to the IRS under the original FATCA
model.152 This routing method allows financial institutions that
wish to participate to do so regardless of their government’s
policy decisions.153 It also pressures non-participating
jurisdictions
to
cooperate.154
Thus,
the
proposed
intergovernmental approach’s bifurcated routing method
incentivizes cooperation, reduces reporting burdens for FFIs, and
mitigates sovereignty concerns.
The Joint Statement also expresses a commitment “to
working with other FATCA partners, the OECD, and where
appropriate the EU, on . . . the development of reporting and due
diligence standards.” Development of uniform standards for
reporting and due diligence would mitigate the burden on FFIs
and streamline the process of automatic information reporting.155
The proposed intergovernmental approach is a step in the
right direction, as it addresses many of the concerns associated
149. Grinberg, supra note 51, at 57.
150. Id.
151. Id.; see also supra Part IV.B (discussing conflict of laws issues
associated with FATCA’s unilateral approach).
152. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing FATCA reporting requirements).
153. Grinberg, supra note 51, at 57.
154. Id.
155. See FATCA Hearing, supra note 10, at 17 (“It is fundamentally
important to achieve consistent standards of transparency that support
compliance without overly burdening the efficiency of cross border portfolio
investment flows.”) (statement of William J. Wilkins, Chief Counsel, Internal
Revenue Serv.).
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with FATCA while preserving the goal of the legislation. In
addition to the five countries represented in the Joint Statement,
others have expressed interest in participating.156 Broader
participation would improve effectiveness of a multilateral
automatic information reporting system and increase pressure on
resisting jurisdictions.157 Eventually, noncompliance may become
unsustainable.158
D. Room for Compromise: Citizenship-Based Taxation
Despite its commitment to a collaborative FATCA regime,
the proposed intergovernmental approach ignores a significant
underlying inconsistency: basis for taxation. Whereas most
countries impose taxes on resident and source income, the United
States also taxes nonresident citizens. This inconsistency
provides an opportunity to reevaluate the policy of taxation based
solely on citizenship159 and, this Note argues, to terminate it.
First, strong non-FATCA based arguments exist in favor of
eliminating citizenship-based taxation.160 The United States is
the only country in the world to base worldwide taxation solely on
citizenship.161 This policy dates back to the Civil War,162 and is
156. See FT Advisor, Ireland and Luxembourg Support European FATCA
Deal (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.ftadviser.com/2012/02/17/investments/offshorefunds/ireland-and-luxembourg-support-european-fatca-dealAal0cGugxkfNiHJYb1ql0H/article.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (noting that
Ireland and Luxembourg have come out in support of the Joint Statement) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
157. Grinberg, supra note 51, at 61.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 58 n.205 (“An eventual multilateral system would be unlikely
to retain FATCA’s concern with citizenship in addition to residence.”).
160. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens 2 (Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 190, 2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578272
(arguing that “citizenship-based taxation is an anomaly that should be
abandoned”); see also Cynthia Blum & Paula N. Singer, A Coherent Policy
Proposal for U.S. Residence-Based Taxation of Individuals, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 705, 711 (2008) (arguing against citizenship-based taxation on
administrability grounds).
161. Id. at 1. “Etitrea is sometimes mentioned as another one, but it is
unclear that it actually taxes nonresident citizens.” Id.
162. Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L.
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protected via a “saving clause” in U.S. income tax treaties.163
Historic U.S. justifications for taxing nonresident citizens,
including deterring draft-dodging and flight of wealthy
Americans, no longer apply.164 Similarly, arguments in favor of
taxing these individuals are weak,165 especially in light of existing
alternative bases for taxation.166
Second, FATCA imposes substantial burdens on U.S. citizens
living abroad in the form of complex reporting requirements167
and, in some circumstances, barriers to obtaining a foreign bank
account, insurance, or pension.168 Under FATCA, FBAR, and
other
existing
reporting
requirements,
inadvertent
noncompliance may result in steep civil and criminal penalties
that are often disproportionately high in comparison to the
amount of tax involved.169 Abandoning taxation of nonresident
citizens could lead to significant simplification and reduction of
administrative costs, which likely exceeds the revenue collected
solely on the basis of citizenship.170
Third, elimination of citizenship-based taxation would not
impair FATCA’s goals of tracking down tax evaders and raising
revenue. FATCA was designed to fight offshore tax evasion by
“bad actors” whose primary reason for establishing and
maintaining unreported overseas accounts was to hide income
REV. 443, 449 (2007).
163. See U.S. Model Treaty, supra note 41, Art. 1 para. 4. (“[T]his convention
shall not affect the taxation by a Contracting State of its residents . . . and its
citizens.”).
164. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 160, at 1–2 (noting that this rule was
created at a time when the income tax applied only to the rich and when some of
the rich moved overseas to avoid the draft).
165. See id. at 6–10 (addressing the benefits, ability-to-pay, and
administrability justifications for citizenship-based taxation).
166. The United States also imposes income tax on residents and U.S.
source income.
167. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text (discussing FATCA
reporting requirements); see also TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 23, at
132 (discussing the overwhelming complexity and administrative detail of
international reporting requirements).
168. Supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
169. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 23, at 133–34 (listing
potentially applicable civil and criminal penalties relating to individual U.S.
taxpayers with foreign assets).
170. Avi-Yonah, supra note 160, at 8.
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and avoid paying U.S. taxes they legally owe.171 In contrast, the
estimated five to seven million172 U.S. citizens living abroad
generally fall into a category of “benign actors”173 whose primary
reasons for establishing and maintaining overseas accounts are
unrelated to tax. Nonresident citizens include a wide range of
individuals, from those who choose or are assigned to live
overseas due to the opportunities of globalization to “accidental
citizens” who were merely born in America and left the country at
a young age.174 The average nonresident citizen holds foreign
assets, including bank accounts, retirement funds, insurance
plans, and investments, that are necessary for living and working
in his country of residence. Similarly, due to international income
exclusions and credits, citizens living abroad have, at most, a de
minimis tax liability.175 Despite this inconsistency, FATCA poses
serious problems for U.S. citizens living abroad.176
Finally, termination of citizenship-based taxation would
facilitate an intergovernmental approach to automatic
information reporting.177 Requiring financial institutions to
identify both a taxpayer’s residence and citizenship, as is
currently the case, doubles the amount of work required for
compliance with FATCA. Unlike other FATCA requirements
under the intergovernmental approach, identifying a taxpayer’s
citizenship would only benefit the United States.178 Conversely,
the ability to apply a single standard for identifying taxpayers
171. See supra Part II.A (discussing FATCA’s goals); see also TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 23, at 194 (noting that international information
reporting penalties, FBAR, and FATCA are designed to combat deliberate
offshore tax evasion).
172. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 23, at 192 n.7 (citing
estimates that the number of U.S. citizens residing abroad is between five to
seven million, not including U.S. troops).
173. See id. at 194 (listing examples of “benign actors”).
174. Avi-Yonah, supra note 160, at 5.
175. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 23, at 194 n.16 (noting that,
in the 2009 tax year, only about 9% of international taxpayers had a U.S. tax
liability after claiming the foreign earned income exclusion and applying the
foreign tax credit).
176. See supra Part III.A (discussing the implications of FATCA for
American citizens living abroad).
177. Supra note 159 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (noting that the United
States is the only country that uses citizenship as a basis for taxation).
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based on residence would improve efficiency and reduce the
burden on financial institutions to the benefit of all FATCA
partners. Further, this compromise may induce other countries to
participate in the proposed intergovernmental approach. This
may be especially true of countries, like Canada, that are home to
a significant number of U.S. citizens.179
In sum, taxation of nonresident citizens is inconsistent with
global norms, creates administrative inefficiencies, and impairs
development of a multilateral FATCA regime. For these reasons,
the United States should abandon the policy of citizenship-based
taxation.
VI. Conclusion
Since its enactment, strong criticisms have been raised about
FATCA’s approach to international tax enforcement and its
potential unintended consequences. In response, the U.S.
government has expressed a willingness to adopt an
intergovernmental approach to FATCA implementation. This
Note argues that the type of international collaboration
envisioned in the Joint Statement is essential to successful
FATCA implementation. It also asserts that a multilateral
automatic information reporting regime supports the policy goals
of FATCA and mitigates the concerns associated with a unilateral
approach. Finally, this Note argues that the United States should
abandon its policy of citizenship-based taxation in order to
facilitate a multilateral automatic information reporting regime.

179. Barrie McKenna, U.S. Eases Move on Offshore Tax Crackdown, GLOBE
MAIL (Feb. 8, 2011, 7:34 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-onbusiness/international-business/us-business/us-eases-move-on-offshore-taxcrackdown/article4202478/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2012) (discussing Canada’s
conspicuous absence from the joint statement and noting that Canada is home
to roughly one million U.S. citizens) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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